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1 Introduction
Consider the following stylized situation. There are two parties, a (potential)
buyer who is interested in one unit of a specific good, and a (potential) seller
who can produce this good for the buyer. While producing the good, the
seller can exert more or less unobservable eﬀort. When the buyer sees the
finished product, he privately realizes whether his willingness-to-pay for the
good is high or low, which stochastically depends upon the seller’s eﬀort level.
Finally, the good can be exchanged and payments can be made. There are
no third parties, no liability constraints, and both parties are risk-neutral.
What kind of contract should they write? Although this seems to be one of
the most basic and natural problems a contract theorist might think of, it
has not yet been analyzed. The purpose of this paper is to fill this small but
surprising gap in the literature.
It turns out that the simplest model capable of dealing with that sort of
problem leads to some interesting insights. The first best cannot be achieved
whenever trade is ex post eﬃcient with certainty. This might be surprising for
some readers, since none of the sources of ineﬃciencies most often discussed in
the literature are present here. Namely, the parties are neither risk-averse nor
wealth constrained, and there is no precontractual private information (i.e.,
adverse selection).1 Furthermore, the parties can write complete contracts
which are then enforced by the courts, so that no renegotiation-proofness
constraints are imposed and money burning is not ruled out. The basic
reason for the ineﬃciency result in this paper is the fact that the parties
face a fundamental trade-oﬀ between inducing the seller to exert eﬀort and
inducing the buyer to reveal his valuation.
1Note that from a pure contract-theoretic point of view, the model developed in this
note has an advantage over models which assume that there are rents due to precontrac-
tual private information or wealth constraints, because here the eﬃciency of the optimal
contract does not depend upon the distribution of the initial bargaining powers.
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The contract which is optimal in a second-best sense can be characterized
as follows. If the seller’s eﬀort costs are smaller than a certain cut-oﬀ value,
high eﬀort will be induced by giving up ex post eﬃcient trade sometimes.
Specifically, if the buyer’s valuation is low, the good is exchanged only with a
probability smaller than one. However, if the buyer’s valuation is high, trade
always occurs, i.e., the well-known “no distortions at the top” property is
rediscovered within the framework of this paper. This property has formerly
been derived in quite diﬀerent models involving adverse selection or risk
aversion.2 If the seller’s eﬀort costs are higher than the cut-oﬀ value, the
second-best contract always leads to ex post eﬃcient trade. In this case,
however, the seller has no incentives to provide any eﬀort.
This paper is related to the literature in several ways. First, it is well
known from the literature on bilateral trading problems that if the parties
are symmetrically informed at the contracting stage, hidden information does
not lead to ineﬃciencies.3 Second, it is also well-known from the literature on
moral hazard in teams that two-sided hidden action can lead to ineﬃciencies,
provided the parties cannot commit to burn money.4 In this paper it is argued
that ineﬃciency can be unavoidable if there is one-sided hidden action and
one-sided hidden information, even if the parties can commit to burn money.
Moreover, Rogerson [27] showed that if the parties can write complete
contracts and commit not to renegotiate, the first-best solution to the hold-
up problem can be achieved, even if the parties’ valuations are private in-
2See e.g. the surveys of Hart and Holmström [9] and Fudenberg and Tirole [7, Ch. 7],
and the literature cited there.
3See d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [2]. Recall that Myerson and Satterthwaite’s [24]
famous impossibility result and the two-type version by Matsuo [20] require precontractual
private information. See also Makowski and Mezzetti [16] and Schweizer [31] for references
to the more recent literature.
4See Holmström [12], and cf. Kim and Wang [13] and Strausz [32] for more recent
literature.
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formation.5 However, in the standard formulation of the hold-up problem,
parties’ investments only influence their own valuations from trade (they are
‘selfish’). In contrast, here the seller’s investment (i.e., eﬀort) influences the
buyer’s type. In a complete information framework Maskin and Moore [17]
showed that with such ‘cooperative’ investment the first best may not be
achievable if parties cannot commit not to renegotiate.6 Here it is argued
that with hidden information the first best may not be implementable even
if renegotiation can be ruled out.7 Farrell and Gibbons [6] also analyze a
trade-oﬀ between information revelation and investment incentives. How-
ever, their model is driven by adverse selection, while here the parties are
ex ante symmetrically informed. Finally, Gul [8] also models a hold-up
problem with one-sided investment and one-sided private information. He
considers ‘selfish’ investment which deterministically influences the buyer’s
valuation and assumes that no contracts can be written. Using arguments
related to the literature on the Coase conjecture, he shows that when the
seller can make repeated oﬀers, the first best is achieved if the time between
oﬀers vanishes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic model. Section 3 demonstrates that no contract can achieve the
first best whenever trade is always ex post eﬃcient. Contracts which are
optimal in the second-best sense are derived in Section 4. An interesting
5See also Konakayama, Mitsui, and Watanabe [15] and proposition 1 (ii) in Hermalin
and Katz [11].
6Cf. also Che and Hausch’s [3] generalization of their result. Note that with ‘selfish’
investments the first best may be achievable with renegotiation (see Aghion, Dewatripont,
and Rey [1], Nöldeke and Schmidt [25], and Edlin and Reichelstein [4] for the case of
observable valuations and Schmitz [30] for the case of unobservable valuations).
7Che and Hausch [3] argue that under complete information the first best can be
achieved if renegotiation can be ruled out and if the class of contracts is not restricted.
See the working paper version of their article for a discussion of such restrictions. I would
like to thank Yeon-Koo Che for pointing out to me this relation to the present note.
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application of the basic model is briefly considered in Section 5. Finally,
some concluding remarks with regard to renegotiation, the inclusion of third
parties, and risk-aversion follow in Section 6.
2 The model
Consider a buyer (B) and a seller (S) both of whom are risk neutral. At some
initial date 0, they can write a contract specifying the production and the
terms of trade of an indivisible good.8 At date 1, the seller chooses how much
eﬀort to exert while producing the good. Suppose that she can either be lazy
(e = el) or provide a high level of eﬀort, e = eh, where 0 ≤ el < eh < 1. The
monetary equivalent of her disutility of eﬀort is represented by c(e), which
satisfies c(el) = 0 and c(eh) = c > 0.9 The buyer’s valuation for the good
is determined by the seller’s eﬀort level and the state of the world, which
is realized at date 2. Specifically, assume that the buyer’s valuation is high
(v = vh) with probability e and low (v = vl) with probability 1 − e, where
vh > vl > 0. Finally, trade can occur and payments can be made at date 3.
In addition to her eﬀort costs at date 1, the seller may have to incur certain
commonly known costs k if trade occurs at date 3.10
8In an alternative interpretation the good is divisible, but there is a capacity constraint
of 1 and the buyer’s utility is linear in quantity. In what follows, the term ‘probability of
trade’ can then be replaced by ‘level of trade’. Notice that most papers on bilateral trading
problems such as Myerson and Satterthwaite [24] assume indivisibility. The contributions
of Maskin and Riley [18], McAfee [21], and McKelvey and Page [22] suggest that the case
of strictly diminishing marginal utility might be a fruitful topic for further research.
9The model can easily be extended to the case 0 < c(el) < c. The assumption c(el) = 0
does not lead to the loss of any economic insights and is made for expositional purposes
only. Note also that additional production costs which are verifiable could be dealt with
in a straightforward way.
10Since the idea is that the good is valuable for the buyer only, the date-3-costs k may
well be zero. They could be positive if there are delivery costs. Alternatively, the seller
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Let q ∈ [0, 1] be the probability of trade and let tB and tS denote the
payments which the buyer and the seller receive, respectively. Suppose that
there is no third party which could act as a budget breaker, i.e., the ex post
budget constraint tB + tS ≤ 0 must be met.11 Then the (expected) utilities
of the buyer and the seller after date 2 are given by
uB = tB + qv
uS = tS − qk − c(e).
The reservation utilities of the parties are normalized to zero. Total wel-
fare is measured by the social surplus uB + uS. Note that if there were no
incentive problems, the parties would agree on welfare-maximizing invest-
ment, trade and transfer decisions which would yield the first-best expected
surplus
ΨFB = max
e∈{el,eh}
¡
e [vh − k]+ + (1− e) [vl − k]+ − c(e)
¢
, (1)
where [·]+ = max{0, ·}. I say that “the first best can be achieved” if a contract
can be written which induces rational parties to act in a way such that the
expected surplus is ΨFB.
Lemma 1 In order to achieve the first best it is necessary to implement the
high eﬀort level, eFB = eh, if and only if
c < (eh − el)
¡
[vh − k]+ − [vl − k]+
¢
.
may have the possibility to sell the good for its scrap value if trade does not occur, so
that k are the seller’s opportunity costs. In both cases it makes sense to assume that k
is a fixed number. Note that negative values of k are formally covered by the model (the
scrap value may be negative if there are disposal costs).
11Actually, the optimal contract will never prescribe any money burning, so that one
could make the usual assumption that the seller receives exactly the amount of money
which the buyer pays, i.e., tB + tS ≡ 0. However, if the parties can commit to ex post
ineﬃcient choices of q, it is not obvious why commitment to money burning should be
ruled out a priori.
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Proof. This is obvious.
Notice that if k < vl, the first best requires that trade always occurs. In
this case, it is eﬃcient to exert high instead of low eﬀort if the costs of doing
so, c, are smaller than the increase in probability that the buyer’s valuation
will be high, eh − el, times the additional gains from trade if v = vh, which
are given by vh − vl. If vl ≤ k < vh, it is ex post eﬃcient that trade only
occurs whenever the buyer’s valuation is high. In this case it is eﬃcient to
choose e = eh, if the eﬀort costs c are smaller than the increase in probability
that the buyer’s valuation is high, eh − el, times the additional gains from
trade, which are then given by vh − k.
3 The basic trade-oﬀ
Following the traditional complete contracting (or mechanism design) ap-
proach, I assume throughout that the courts enforce contracts specifying
trade and payment rules
¡
q, tB, tS
¢
which are based on verifiable variables
(possibly including announcements of the parties). It is straightforward to
see that the first best could easily be achieved if it were possible to contract
upon the level of eﬀort or upon the realization of the buyer’s valuation. How-
ever, throughout the remainder of this note I assume that neither the seller’s
eﬀort choice e, nor the buyer’s valuation v is observable.
Due to the revelation principle (cf. Myerson [23]), the analysis can be con-
fined to direct revelation mechanisms which prescribe a probability of trade
q (v˜) and transfers tB (v˜) , tS (v˜) contingent upon the buyer’s announcement
of his type, v˜. For notational simplicity, let
¡
ql, tBl , t
S
l
¢
and
¡
qh, tBh , t
S
h
¢
repre-
sent the alternatives between which the buyer can choose by claiming to be
of type vl and vh, respectively. The incentive compatibility conditions which
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make truth-telling an optimal strategy for the buyer are
qhvh + tBh ≥ qlvh + tBl (2)
qlvl + tBl ≥ qhvl + tBh . (3)
Notice that only the buyer is required to reveal his private information.
It is not necessary to ask the seller which eﬀort level she has chosen, since
this is already known in equilibrium. The seller has an incentive to choose
the high level of eﬀort whenever the following condition is satisfied:
eh
¡
tSh − qhk
¢
+ (1− eh)
¡
tSl − qlk
¢
− c ≥ el
¡
tSh − qhk
¢
+ (1− el)
¡
tSl − qlk
¢
This condition is obviously equivalent to
(eh − el)
¡
tSh − tSl − (qh − ql)k
¢
≥ c. (4)
Given that the eﬀort choice e is to be implemented, the following partic-
ipation constraints for the buyer and the seller, respectively, must hold:
e
¡
qhvh + tBh
¢
+ (1− e)
¡
qlvl + tBl
¢
≥ 0 (5)
e
¡
tSh − qhk
¢
+ (1− e)
¡
tSl − qlk
¢
− c(e) ≥ 0 (6)
The following proposition says that in the (seemingly) trivial case, in which
trade is always eﬃcient, the first best cannot be achieved. However, in the
non-trivial case, in which it depends upon the realization of the buyer’s
valuation v whether or not trade is eﬃcient, the first best can be achieved.
Proposition 1 Assume that eFB = eh.
a) If k < vl, there is no contract which achieves the first best.
b) If k ≥ vl, the first best can be achieved with an appropriate option
contract.
Proof. See the appendix.
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At first sight, one could guess that it should be easier to achieve the first
best in the case of a trivial trade decision, but somewhat surprisingly this is
not true. The intuition for the result is as follows. If trade is always ex post
eﬃcient and the first best is to be implemented, then the parties’ utilities are
entirely determined by the payments they get. Therefore, the buyer will not
reveal his type truthfully unless he always gets the same (negative) payment,
independent of his report. Yet, if no money may be wasted, this implies that
the seller always receives the same amount of money. As a consequence, she
has no incentives to provide eﬀort. Note that part a) of Proposition 1 can
easily be generalized to the case of a continuous eﬀort choice and general
distributions of v. Whenever the ex post eﬃcient trade decision is trivial, so
that the first best requires q(v) ≡ 1, truth-telling implies that the buyer’s
payment must be constant, and hence the seller cannot be induced to exert
costly eﬀort.
Consider now the non-trivial case in which trade is ex post eﬃcient if and
only if the buyer has a high valuation. Then it is possible to achieve ex post
eﬃciency by writing a contract which gives the buyer the option to buy the
good at a price that lies in the interval [vl, vh]. The seller then gets a payment
if and only if the buyer’s valuation is high. In particular, the price can be
set equal to vh, which makes the seller residual claimant, so that she has an
incentive to exert eﬀort. Note that part b) of Proposition 1 also holds if the
eﬀort choice is continuous. Since the seller can be made residual claimant, it
is still possible to induce the eﬃcient eﬀort decision in this case. However,
part b) of Proposition 1 does depend on the assumption that v ∈ {vl, vh}. If
there are more than two possible realizations of the buyer’s valuation, truth-
telling implies that the buyer’s payment must be constant over all valuations
for which trade is eﬃcient, and it also must be constant over all valuations for
which trade is ineﬃcient. Hence, it is in general no longer possible to make
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the seller residual claimant, so that the first best may not be achievable.12
Remark 1 If eFB = el, the first best can always be achieved.
Proof. See the appendix.
4 The second-best contract
Consider now the case in which according to Proposition 1 the first best
cannot be achieved. The following proposition characterizes a second-best
contract, i.e., a contract which yields the expected surplus that can maxi-
mally be achieved under the relevant incentive constraints.
Proposition 2 Consider the case eFB = eh and k < vl. Define
κ =
(eh − el)2 (vh − vl) (vh − k)
(eh − el) (vh − k) + (1− eh) (vl − k)
.
• If c ≤ κ, the parties implement high eﬀort by writing a contract with
the following properties:
— No ineﬃciencies in the good state:
qh = 1, tBh + t
S
h = 0
— Ineﬃciently low probability of trade, but no money burning in the
bad state:
ql = 1−
c
(eh − el) (vh − k)
, tBl + t
S
l = 0
12It is straightforward to construct examples with three possible realizations of v, such
that the first best cannot be achieved even if the eﬃcient trade decision is non-trivial. If v
is continuously distributed, the truth-telling constraints imply that the buyer’s payment
is uniquely determined up to an integration constant by the decision rule (see Myerson
and Satterthwaite [24]), so that if the trade decision has to be ex post eﬃcient, no costly
eﬀort can ever be induced without ineﬃcient money burning. Details are available from
the author upon request.
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Furthermore, the transfer payments are determined by tSh = t
S
l +(1− ql) vh
and tSl ∈ [qlk − (1− ql)el(vh − k), ql (ehvh + (1− eh)vl)] , depending upon the
distribution of the initial bargaining powers.
• If c > κ, the parties implement no eﬀort and trade always takes place.
An optimal contract is given by qh = ql = 1 and tSh = t
S
l = −tBh =
−tBl ∈ [k, elvh + (1− el)vl].
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 2 says that two cases have to be distinguished. First, if the
seller’s eﬀort costs are lower than a certain cut-oﬀ value κ, the parties want
to implement high eﬀort. However, by Proposition 1 this is not possible as
long as trade always occurs and no money is burnt. The proof of Proposition
2 shows that giving up trade in some instances is the cheapest way to im-
plement high eﬀort. Specifically, trade always takes place in the good state
of the world. This result is reminiscent of the “no distortions at the top”
property which has formerly been derived in models that are based on other
sources of ineﬃciencies (precontractual private information or risk aversion).
In the bad state of the world, trade only takes place with a probability smaller
than one.13 Second, if the seller’s eﬀort costs are higher than the cut-oﬀ level
κ, it is too expensive to implement high eﬀort. In this case, the parties prefer
to achieve ex post eﬃciency, i.e., trade always takes place.
Remark 2 The cut-oﬀ value κ lies in the interval (0, (eh − el) [vh − vl]). It
is increasing in vh, eh, and k, and decreasing in vl and el.
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
13Note that one could interpret this mechanism as a modified option contract. The buyer
has the option to buy the good for sure at the price tSh . If the buyer does not exercise this
option, he has to pay tSl and the allocation of the good is determined by an appropriate
lottery.
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The first part of the remark shows that both cases described above can
actually occur. The second part confirms the intuition that, ceteris paribus,
implementing high instead of low eﬀort becomes relatively more attractive
compared to achieving ex post eﬃciency (i.e., always trade) if vh, eh or k
are increased, while the opposite is true if vl or el are increased.
5 An application: Endogenous preferences for
risky projects
Suppose that ex ante the parties can choose between two diﬀerent technolo-
gies (or projects). If technology i ∈ {A,B} is used, the buyer’s valuation
is vih in the good state and v
i
l in the bad state of the world. For simplicity,
assume that k = 0 and that there are no further diﬀerences between the two
technologies. The choice of a technology is assumed to be verifiable.
Definition 1 Technology A is called strictly superior with respect to tech-
nology B, if
elvAh + (1− el) vAl > elvBh + (1− el) vBl and
ehvAh + (1− eh) vAl > ehvBh + (1− eh) vBl .
Thus, technology A is strictly superior if it always leads to a higher ex-
pected valuation, independent of whether the seller exerts low or high eﬀort.
At first sight, one might guess that the parties always prefer a strictly superior
technology. However, the following proposition shows that this is actually
not the case.
Proposition 3 Let eFB = eh. Suppose that the parties can contractually
specify the usage of a technology i ∈ {A,B}. They prefer technology B when-
ever the expected surplus resulting from the second-best contract,
max
½
ehvih + (1− eh)vil − c
µ
1 +
(1− eh)vil
(eh − el) vih
¶
, elvih + (1− el)vil
¾
,
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is maximized by i = B. This can happen even if technology A is strictly
superior.
Proof. The first claim follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 2.
In order to prove the second claim, it is suﬃcient to give an example. One
such example is illustrated in Figure 1.14
1.5
                        first-best surplus
                              (technology A)
                                     second-best:
                                            technology B
                                            yields larger
                                            surplus
    c.39     κ  .22
1.4
1
Figure 1
In Figure 1, the solid line represents the expected surplus generated by the
second-best contract if technology A is chosen, depending upon the seller’s
eﬀort costs c. If c is smaller than κ, high eﬀort is induced. Otherwise, the
surplus is given by elvAh + (1− el)vAl , which is independent of c. As a bench-
mark, the expected surplus which can be generated in a first-best world is
illustrated by the dashed line. Of course, for high levels of c it is optimal to
exert no eﬀort even in a first-best world. Note also that for c = 0 the first
14In this example, eh = 12 , el = 0, v
A
l = 1, v
A
h = 2, v
B
l = .1, and v
B
h = 2.7. Obviously,
technology A is strictly superior. However, straightforward calculations show that the
expected surplus generated by the second-best contract is higher for technology B, if c is
larger than .216 and smaller than 2770 ≈ .386.
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best can be achieved. Finally, the dotted line shows the expected surplus
which can be generated by a second-best contract if technology B is used.
If c is large enough, technology A will certainly be preferred, since by as-
sumption elvAh + (1− el)vAl > elvBh + (1− el)vBl . Also, if c is (close to) zero,
the superior technology A must by definition (and due to continuity) yield
a higher expected surplus than technology B. However, the example shows
that there can be an intermediate range of values of c for which technology
B generates a higher expected surplus than technology A.
The intuitive feeling that the parties should always prefer a strictly supe-
rior technology is justified only in a first-best world. In a second-best world,
a superior technology can be suboptimal because it can make the introduc-
tion of larger distortions necessary. In other words, even if technology A is
superior, it can be easier to induce high eﬀort when technology B is used.
It is interesting to note that although the parties are risk neutral, they
may hence prefer a technology (or a project) which is more risky, even if its
expected value is smaller. In order to see this, note that B can be preferred
over A in the above discussion, if vBl < v
A
l and v
B
h > v
A
h (which makes the
loss due to the distortion in case B smaller than in A), so that the spread
vBh − vBl is larger than vAh − vAl .
6 Discussion
A. Renegotiation
It has been assumed throughout that the parties can write complete con-
tracts that rule out renegotiation. While this is a common assumption in
traditional mechanism design theory,15 recent papers on incomplete contracts
15Cf. Myerson and Satterthwaite [24], Samuelson [29], Matsuo [20], or Klibanoﬀ and
Morduch [14], who base their explanation of ex post ineﬃciencies in bilateral trade rela-
tionships on precontractual private information. In these papers it is also assumed that
14
have stressed the eﬀects of renegotiation. For this purpose, consider again
the case k < vl, i.e., the case in which the first-best cannot be achieved.
Since it is common knowledge that trade is eﬃcient, perfect renegotiation
ex post should always lead to q = 1, so that by the proof of Proposition 1
it were impossible to give the seller any incentives to provide eﬀort. Thus,
the optimal contract in this case would be what Hart and Moore [10] call
the “quintessentially incomplete contract”, namely no contract at all.16 How-
ever, as has been pointed out by Maskin and Tirole [19], the assumption that
renegotiation cannot be prevented is motivated in the literature by consider-
ations that lie outside the existing models. It is unclear why a court should
not enforce a non-renegotiation clause if the parties register their contract
publicly.17 Moreover, as has been pointed out by Rogerson [27], even if one
believes that renegotiation cannot always be ruled out in reality, it is impor-
tant to have a benchmark in order to assess the resulting welfare losses.
B. Inclusion of third parties
Throughout it has been assumed that there are only two parties. The results
would change if it were possible to include a risk-neutral third party who
could act as a financial wedge between the buyer and the seller.18 Consider
once again the case k < vl and suppose that the following contract is written.
The good is always exchanged and the buyer has to pay tl to the seller. In
addition, independent of whether trade occurs, the buyer always has to pay
a fixed premium th − tl, either to the seller, or to the third party. Hence, it
renegotiation can be ruled out.
16Cf. also Proposition 1 in Rubinstein and Wolinsky [28], who analyze a related problem
in a complete information framework.
17See also Tirole [33] for a more extensive discussion of this point.
18The assumption that there is no budget-breaker is also essential in Holmström’s [12]
“moral hazard in teams” problem. Note that the ineﬃciency result obtained here is in
a certain sense stronger, since in Holmström’s model the first best could be achieved if
commitment to money burning were allowed.
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is an optimal strategy for the buyer to pay the premium to the seller if and
only if his valuation is high. It is then possible to give the seller incentives to
exert high eﬀort by choosing th − tl ≥ ceh−el . Therefore, the first-best trade
and eﬀort levels can be implemented without ineﬃcient money burning. The
gains from the inclusion of a third party could be divided by an up-front
payment.
However, it is not clear whether one could actually find a third party
willing to participate in such a contractual agreement. The reason is that a
third party would not be willing to make an up-front payment unless it really
believed to receive the premium whenever the buyer’s valuation is low.19 But
once the buyer’s valuation has been realized, he loses nothing if he pays the
premium to the seller instead of to the third party. In particular, if there is
some possibility of collusion between the buyer and the seller, the potential
eﬃciency gains from the inclusion of a third party may well be prevented
from actually being realized.20
C. Risk aversion
Following most papers on bilateral trading and hold-up problems, so far it
has been assumed that the parties’ utility functions are linear in money. It
will now be shown that risk aversion can make high eﬀort implementable
without money burning or the presence of a third party, even if trade occurs
with certainty.21 Assume that the seller is still risk-neutral, but the buyer
is risk-averse in income. Let the buyer’s utility be additively separable in
money and consumption and let his disutility of having to make a transfer
t be given by the strictly concave function u(−t). Suppose that the parties
19Note that without an up-front payment from the third party, inclusion of the third
party is (from the point of view of the buyer and the seller) the same as money burning.
It has already been shown that the buyer and the seller never want to make use of this
possibility.
20See also Eswaran and Kotwal’s [5] discussion of Holmström’s [12] model.
21I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the following argument.
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write the following contract. The good is always exchanged. When the buyer
announces vi, i ∈ {l, h}, his payment to the seller is ti with probability xi and
ti with probability 1−xi. Since trade always occurs, the buyer’s truth-telling
constraints (2) and (3) now require
xhu(−th) + (1− xh)u(−th) = xlu(−tl) + (1− xl)u(−tl).
Adapting (4), the seller chooses e = eh if
(eh − el)
£
xhth + (1− xh)th − xltl − (1− xl)tl
¤
≥ c.
Due to Jensen’s inequality it is possible to satisfy both conditions by de-
signing the two lotteries such that the expected payment if vh is announced
suﬃciently exceeds the expected payment if vl is announced, but the lottery
triggered by vl is riskier such that the risk-averse buyer is indiﬀerent between
both lotteries.
Note, however, that this solution does not achieve the first best in the
modified model, since in equilibrium the risk-averse buyer is exposed to a
stochastic transfer scheme.22 This is to be contrasted with Rasmusen [26],
who has pointed out that Holmström’s [12] famous “moral hazard in teams”
problem can be solved if the agents are risk-averse. In his model a lottery is
used to punish risk-averse agents out of equilibrium only.23
22This is similar to the standard principal-agent problem, in which the first-best eﬀort
level could well be implemented by exposing the agent to risk, but in the first-best solution
the agent’s wage must be constant (see e.g. Hart and Holmström [9]).
23Cf. also Maskin and Moore [17], who demonstrate that their well known result that
under symmetric information the hold-up problem cannot be resolved if investments are
‘cooperative’ and renegotiation cannot be ruled out only holds under risk-neutrality, but
not under risk-aversion.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1.
a) First, consider the case k < vl. The first-best surplus eh (vh − k)+
(1− eh) (vl − k) − c can only be generated if ql = qh = 1 and e = eh are
implemented. The incentive compatibility conditions (2), (3), and (4) then
read
tBh − tBl ≥ 0 (7)
tBh − tBl ≤ 0 (8)
tSh − tSl ≥
c
eh − el
. (9)
The inequalities (7) and (8) imply that the (possibly negative) transfer to
the buyer must not depend on the realization of his valuation, i.e., tBh = t
B
l
must hold. This implies that (9) cannot be satisfied without ineﬃcient money
burning. Thus, the first best cannot be achieved.
b) Consider the case vl ≤ k. Now the first-best surplus is given by
eh (vh − k)− c, which can be generated by the decisions qh = 1, ql = 0, and
e = eh. In this case, the incentive compatibility conditions (2), (3), and (4)
become
tBh − tBl ≥ −vh (10)
tBh − tBl ≤ −vl (11)
tSh − tSl ≥
c
eh − el
+ k. (12)
If no money is burnt, tBh = −tSh and tBl = −tSl , so that (10) and (11) read
vl ≤ tSh − tSl ≤ vh. (13)
Note that vl < ceh−el + k < vh (see Lemma 1). It is hence possible to
satisfy (12) and (13) simultaneously, e.g. by choosing tSh − tSl = vh. Thus,
the first-best solution can be implemented. Any division of the expected
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surplus can then be achieved by an appropriate choice of tSl , which must lie
in the interval [c− eh (vh − k) , 0] , due to the participation constraints (5)
and (6). Note that the outlined direct mechanism corresponds to a simple
option contract. The buyer always pays tSl to the seller. He then has the
option to buy the good at a price tSh − tSl .
B. Proof of Remark 1.
Consider the following simple contract. The buyer can decide whether or
not to trade at the fixed price k. Then, ex post eﬃciency is achieved and the
buyer receives the total gains from trade, so that the seller has no incentive
to invest. If the expected surplus is positive, it can be divided between the
parties by an additional up-front payment.
C. Proof of Proposition 2.
First suppose that the parties want to implement e = eh. The problem of the
buyer and the seller is to design a contract
¡
qh, ql, tBh , t
B
l , t
S
h , t
S
l
¢
in order to
maximize the expected surplus
eh
¡
qh [vh − k] + tBh + tSh
¢
+ (1− eh)
¡
ql [vl − k] + tBl + tSl
¢
− c
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (2)− (4), the participation
constraints (5)− (6) with e = eh, the budget constraints
tBh + t
S
h ≤ 0
tBl + t
S
l ≤ 0,
and the constraints that qh and ql must lie in the unit interval.
First note that (2) and (3) imply qh ≥ ql. Furthermore, note that tBh +tSh <
0 cannot hold in the optimal solution, since else it would be possible to
increase the expected surplus by increasing tSh .
In order to prove the remaining claims, I first ignore the constraints (3),
(5), (6), and 0 ≤ ql ≤ 1. The simplified problem is thus to maximize
eh (qh [vh − k]) + (1− eh)
¡
ql [vl − k] + tBl + tSl
¢
− c
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under the constraints
−vh(qh − ql) + tBl ≤ tBh (14)
−k(qh − ql)−
c
eh − el
− tSl ≥ tBh (15)
tBl + t
S
l ≤ 0 (16)
and 0 ≤ qh ≤ 1. Suppose that qh < 1. This cannot be true in the optimal
solution, since else it would be possible to increase qh and ql by the same
marginal amount while keeping all other side constraints satisfied. Thus,
qh = 1. Conditions (14) and (15) then imply that
ql ≤ 1−
tBl + t
S
l +
c
eh−el
vh − k
must hold. Ignoring (14) and (15) , this constraint must be binding, since
otherwise ql could be increased. Now one can easily see that no money must
be burnt. For this purpose, assume that (16) holds with strict inequality.
To be sure, ql = 1 could then be achieved. However, it would be possible to
increase tBl + t
S
l by decreasing ql. Indeed, increasing t
B
l + t
S
l by one marginal
unit makes it necessary to decrease ql by 1vh−k units. But this means that the
objective function’s net change would be positive, since vl−kvh−k < 1. Finally,
it is straightforward to check that the claimed solution satisfies the omitted
constraints.
Thus, the expected surplus given that the parties implement e = eh is
ehvh + (1− eh) vl − k − c−
1− eh
eh − el
vl − k
vh − k
c, (17)
where the last term represents the loss due to the distortion in the bad state
of the world. This expression is larger than the surplus in the low-eﬀort case,
elvl + (1− el)vl − k, if and only if c ≤ κ. It is obvious to see that e = el can
be implemented as claimed in the last part of the proposition.
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